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R e t i r e m e n t  S e c u r i t y
Longevity Insurance 
Annuities: Lessons  
From the United Kingdom
Recent U.S. Treasury Department proposals have focused attention on longevity insurance annuities. These are 
deferred annuities that begin payment at advanced older ages, such as the age of 82. While the United Kingdom 
has by far the world’s largest annuity market, and some insurance companies used to provide longevity insur-
ance annuities, currently no companies provide these annuities. The main reason for the change is that pro-
posed European Union regulations will require insurance companies to increase their reserves for these annui-
ties in recognition that there is no asset available to effectively hedge the risk of unexpectedly large 
improvements in life expectancy.
by David Blake, Ph.D. | The Pensions Institute and John A. Turner, Ph.D. | Pension Policy Center
Longevity insurance is a deferred annuity that starts pay-ing benefits at an advanced age, such as the age of 82. Because these annuities provide insurance against run-
ning out of money at advanced ages, they have attracted in-
terest recently as an important innovation in the way retire-
ment income is provided. In order to encourage their use, in 
2012 the Treasury Department released a proposed regula-
tion designed to encourage 401(k) plans and similar em-
ployer-provided plans to offer a longevity insurance annuity 
as a form of benefit payout. The proposed regulation also ap-
plies to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) (U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury 2012, Turner and McCarthy 2013).
The United Kingdom has experience with longevity in-
surance annuities. The U.K. pension fund industry is the 
second largest in the world by value, with assets of around 
20% of those held in the United States. However, the U.K. 
lifetime annuity market is much larger than in the U.S., ac-
counting for more than half of the world annuity market. 
Around 500,000 annuities are purchased each year at a cost 
of £12 billion ($18.8 billion), mainly as a result of the effec-
tive requirement to buy life annuities as part of defined con-
tribution pension plan provision of annuities (Blake, Board-
man and Cairns 2013a). However, currently no life insurance 
company in the U.K. provides longevity insurance annuities 
to individuals.1
This article explores the reasons why longevity insurance 
annuities would be desirable for some retirees, factors affect-
ing the supply of longevity insurance annuities in the U.S., 
the reasons why they are no longer provided in the U.K. and 
the implications of those reasons for the U.S. It then provides 
benefits quarterly first quarter 201440
a proposal for longevity bonds provided by the government, 
which would facilitate the provision of these annuities. It 
concludes with a brief summary of the lessons for the U.S. 
from the U.K. experience.
Factors Affecting the Demand by Workers  
for Longevity Insurance Annuities
While all annuities provide retirees a degree of longevity 
insurance, in recent years the term longevity insurance has 
been used to refer to a particular type of deferred annuity, 
also known generically as advanced life deferred annuities or 
longevity annuity contracts, as well as by product names used 
by life insurance companies providing them. Longevity in-
surance is a deferred annuity that starts at an advanced age, 
such as the age of 82. This annuity is similar to buying car 
or home insurance with a large deductible, which optimally 
deals with catastrophic risk. By analogy, longevity insurance 
annuities provide insurance against outliving one’s assets, but 
only when that risk becomes substantial at advanced ages 
(Milevsky 2005).
The risk of retirees outliving their assets (and failing to 
leave intended bequests) is increased when life expectancy 
is increasing, when people underestimate their life expectan-
cies and when inflation-adjusted capital market returns are 
low. Retirees, however, also face the opposite risk of spend-
ing less than they otherwise could out of concern for having 
enough assets to pay for an unexpectedly long life (and as 
a result leaving unintended bequests). Unless they choose 
some type of annuity, retirees with 401(k) plans may face the 
difficult challenge of managing the spend-down of their as-
sets over a retirement period of uncertain length.
With a longevity insurance annuity, the planning prob-
lem is greatly simplified. Instead of planning for an uncer-
tain period, participants can plan for a fixed period—from 
the date of their retirement to the date at which they start 
receiving the longevity insurance benefit should they survive 
that long. Longevity insurance thus reduces uncertainty in 
planning. It changes the planning problem from one with an 
uncertain end point (date of death) to one with a certain end 
point (the date at which longevity insurance begins provid-
ing benefits). An additional advantage of longevity insurance 
annuities is that they provide an (imperfect) alternative to 
long-term care insurance for those who are unable to qualify 
for that insurance. With the decline in defined benefit plans, 
they also serve as an alternative to the annuities provided by 
those plans.
Webb et al. (2010) estimate that retirees could maintain 
level income throughout retirement by purchasing at the 
age of 60 longevity insurance providing for payments be-
ginning at the age of 85 for a relatively small amount—15% 
of pension wealth. Thus, a further advantage of a longev-
ity insurance annuity is that it clarifies to the worker that 
he has the option to partially annuitize his account balance, 
rather than making an all-or-nothing decision. It allows in-
dividuals to purchase an annuity without needing to give 
up a relatively large sum of money, which many retirees are 
reluctant to do.
The age of purchase and the length of the deferral af-
fect the level of benefits provided. For example, a longevity 
insurance annuity purchased with $100,000 at the age of 70 
would be expected to provide annual payments starting at 
the age of 85 of between $26,000 and $42,000 depending 
on the interest rate, whether a joint and survivor annuity 
was chosen and other factors. If the purchase was made in-
stead at the age of 65 with the starting date at the age of 85, 
the $42,000 figure would increase to $51,000 (U.S. Treasury 
2012). Alternative estimates indicate that an immediate an-
nuity purchased with $100,000 and starting at the age of 
65 would provide $6,950 a year for life, compared to the 
same purchase with benefits starting at the age of 85 yield-
ing $63,990 for life (Tergesen 2012). These benefits would 
be subject to inflation risk, but some policies allow for lower 
starting benefits with an automatic escalation. The amount 
of benefit depends on the interest rates prevailing at the 
time of purchase, with a risk associated with these annuities 
being that the purchase occurs at a time when interest rates 
are low. A strategy to deal with that risk would involve mak-
ing smaller purchases of longevity insurance annuities over 
a period of several years.
Horneff et al. (2007) use a simulation model to show that 
the percentage of resources that a person would optimally 
annuitize increases over time during retirement. People who 
have some financial resources invested in equity can benefit 
from the equity premium early in retirement, gradually re-
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ducing their investment in equity, and increasing the amount 
that is annuitized. A longevity insurance benefit does not fol-
low a gradual pattern of increasing the share of assets that 
is annuitized, but it does capture some of the benefit of that 
strategy. They find that most retirees optimally would avoid 
full annuitization until an advanced age, but by the age of 
80 would fully annuitize their financial wealth, other than 
wealth used for bequests. Thus, this research provides an ad-
ditional argument in favor of longevity insurance.
Longevity Insurance Annuities in the United States
While most U.S. life insurance companies do not currently 
offer this annuity, three that do are New York Life Insurance 
Company, Symetra Life Insurance Company and Northwest-
ern Mutual Life Insurance Company (Tergesen 2012). New 
York Life is currently the largest seller of this type of annuity 
in the U.S. However, only 4% of the purchasers of these an-
nuities purchase an annuity that is solely a longevity insur-
ance annuity. Most purchase such annuities that also provide 
death benefits (New York Life 2012).
Prudential Supervision of Annuity Providers
Life insurance companies providing annuities are regulat-
ed in the U.S. at the state level. Purchasers of annuities in the 
U.S. are protected against default by state guaranty associa-
tions, but the dollar limit of the coverage varies considerably 
across states and can be as low as $100,000. The National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) sets solvency 
standards for adoption by states. A primary goal of NAIC is 
to harmonize rules across the country. However, states can 
use their own rules.
In 2012, NAIC approved new rules for determining re-
serve requirements that will generally reduce the amount 
of required reserves to be held by life insurance companies. 
Some state regulators, however, have argued that the new 
rules will leave life insurance companies underreserved. The 
change applies to future business and does not affect policies 
already in place, so its effect on reducing the total reserves of 
life insurance companies would phase in over time (Scism 
2012). The new principle-based approach (PBA) to deter-
mining required reserves uses risk analysis and risk manage-
ment techniques to capture underlying annuity risks more 
accurately than the current rule-based approach (American 
Academy of Actuaries 2013). With the new approach, state 
laws would establish principles on which the determination 
of reserves would be based, rather than using specific formu-
las, as is currently done. However, critics argue that the PBA 
requires a level of sophistication that many insurers and reg-
ulators do not possess. It is anticipated that the PBA would 
not become effective as NAIC standards before 2015 (Morris 
2012). States were able to begin adopting the standards in 
2013 (NAIC 2013).
Insurers providing longevity insurance must have suffi-
cient reserves to ensure the provision of these benefits even 
if longevity substantially improves, for example, because of 
a medical breakthrough in gene therapy. The 2013 Trustees 
Report for Social Security (OASDI) lists three different mor-
tality rate decline assumptions. The more costly assumption 
assumes that mortality rates will decline 50% more rapidly 
than does the intermediate assumption (Office of the Chief 
Actuary 2013).
The cost of this risk is greater in a low-interest-rate envi-
ronment than in a high-interest-rate environment, because 
in a low-interest-rate environment the expected present 
value of possible future benefits is greater. Even in a high-
interest-rate environment, the risk of lower interest rates in 
the future is a factor that affects the provision of longevity 
insurance annuities.
government Policy Encouraging  
Use of Longevity Insurance Annuities
A proposed regulation by the Treasury Department in 
early 2012 deals with the issue of required minimum distri-
butions in pension plans, which currently makes it difficult 
to purchase a longevity insurance annuity through a pension 
plan (U.S. Treasury 2012). The proposed regulation clari-
fies that purchase of a qualified longevity insurance annuity 
would not be prohibited by the required minimum distribu-
tion rules, which require that distributions start by the age of 
70½, substantially earlier than distributions from longevity 
insurance annuities, and prescribes their minimum levels. 
Under the proposed amendments to these rules: “prior to 
annuitization, the participant would be permitted to exclude 
the value of a longevity annuity contract that meets certain 
retirement security
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requirements from the account bal-
ance used to determine required mini-
mum distributions.” The percentage of 
the participant’s account balance that 
could be used for this purpose would 
be limited to 25%. In addition, a maxi-
mum dollar amount of $100,000 would 
be set, which would be the maximum 
amount for all plans the participant had 
in which he purchased such an annu-
ity.2 The payment of the annuity must 
begin by the age of 85.3
The annuity would be permitted to 
have an acceleration option, so that 
payments increased over time to offset 
the effect of inflation. The requirements 
allow only a limited number of options 
to be available, in part in order to facili-
tate comparison across products. Other 
requirements would also apply in order 
for the annuity to be a qualifying lon-
gevity annuity contract.
Longevity Insurance Annuities  
in the United Kingdom
More than half the annuities sold in 
the world are sold in the U.K. (Single-
ton et al. 2010). The annuity market in 
the U.K. is the best developed annuity 
market in the world. At one time, lon-
gevity insurance annuities, referred to 
as deferred annuities, were sold in the 
U.K., but that is no longer the case. 
Currently, no life insurance company 
in the U.K. offers these annuities to 
individuals. This section examines the 
reasons for this change.
Prudential Supervision  
of Annuity Providers
The regulator of annuity providers 
(since 2013 the Prudential Regulation 
Authority) focuses on prudent invest-
ment strategy, prudent evaluation of 
assets, the relationship of assets to lia-
bilities and the total amount of reserves 
needed (Daykin undated). Insurance 
companies must set aside reserves now 
for the liabilities they have taken on for 
future benefit payments. Their risks 
can be reduced by investing in assets 
that have payout patterns matching the 
payout requirements of their liabilities. 
To the extent that asset-liability match-
ing is not possible, insurance compa-
nies need to maintain higher reserves 
to protect against higher than expected 
benefit payments. Problems arise both 
for risk management and reserving if it 
is not possible to match asset payouts 
to changes in the liability stream due to 
unexpected increases in longevity.
For determining required reserves 
for annuities, prudence means assum-
ing that life expectancy will be higher 
than the best estimate of life expectan-
cy. Since the most likely rate at which 
mortality will improve in the future is 
difficult to estimate, annuity providers 
need to make an allowance for the un-
certainty surrounding life expectancy 
estimates. Another issue is that annui-
tants with larger annuity values tend 
to be wealthier and have higher life ex-
pectancies, requiring a further upward 
adjustment to reserves to account for 
these selection effects.
In the European Union (EU), a new 
regulatory regime affecting life insur-
ance companies, Solvency II, is due to 
be introduced in 2016 (Institute and 
Faculty of Actuaries 2012). The cur-
rent Solvency II proposals, if adopted, 
will require insurers to hold significant 
additional capital to back their annu-
ity liabilities if longevity risk cannot be 
hedged effectively or marked to market. 
This regulatory approach is based on 
the use of economic principles to mea-
sure the risks of the assets and liabilities 
of insurers to make sure that the regu-
latory capital they hold is appropriately 
aligned to cover these risks.
The problem insurers face is that no 
assets currently available have returns 
that are correlated with longevity risk. 
For this reason, Solvency II requires 
that life insurers providing deferred 
annuities hold reserves substantially in 
excess of expected costs to back these 
annuities. This is to ensure that the in-
surers will have adequate resources to 
provide the promised benefits if life ex-
pectancy improves more than expected 
(i.e., by more than the best estimate) in 
the future.
In the absence of an effective hedge 
against life expectancy improvements, 
Solvency II requires that insurers hold 
sufficient capital to protect themselves 
against 199 out of every 200 likely sce-
narios of life expectancy improvements 
in excess of the best estimate over the 
course of one year (i.e., the capital is 
sufficient to cover 99.5% of likely cases 
of longevity increases). 
This requirement has raised the cost 
of providing deferred annuities to the 
point that life insurance companies 
no longer offer them to individuals in 
the U.K. because they believe demand 
would be insufficient at the prices they 
must charge to cover their reserve costs. 
Another contributing factor affecting 
the lack of provision of longevity insur-
ance annuities is the requirement since 
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the beginning of 2013 that these annuities be provided on a 
unisex basis. The cost difference between the genders in pro-
viding longevity insurance annuities is considerably greater 
than the cost difference in providing immediate annuities at 
retirement age (Turner and McCarthy 2013).
Under Solvency II, it is proposed that insurance liabili-
ties are increased by the addition of a market value margin 
(MVM) reflecting the cost of capital to cover nonhedgeable 
risks. For annuity companies this is principally longevity 
risk. It is currently proposed that in the absence of a hedg-
ing instrument for longevity risk, EU insurers will have to 
charge a 6% cost of capital above the risk-free rate when cal-
culating the MVM. As a consequence of the long duration of 
annuities, the Solvency II requirements could result in the 
amount of capital held for longevity risk approximately dou-
bling from current levels. One-third of this increase is due 
to increased allowances for nonhedgeable longevity risk, and 
the remainder is due to other changes required by Solvency 
II. The resultant extra capital for longevity risk and other Sol-
vency II impacts would have to be passed on to customers, 
and the money’s worth of annuities could fall by up to 10%.
Hedging Longevity Risk
The lack of a hedge against longevity risk in annuities 
raises their cost, and thus is part of the explanation of why 
relatively few people voluntarily purchase annuities. Because 
life insurance companies provide life insurance as well as an-
nuities, it might be thought that the provision of life insur-
ance would serve as a hedge against the risk of improving life 
expectancy. This is known as natural hedging across different 
lines of business. Losses in one line of business could be off-
set by gains in another line. To be most effective, this source 
of hedging would require that the company’s life insurance 
and annuity lines were roughly equal in value, and that their 
new sales of annuities and life insurance were roughly equal 
in value, both requirements limiting the usefulness of the 
hedge.
The main reason why the provision of life insurance is a 
poor hedge for annuities, however, is that the population that 
purchases life insurance tends to be different from the popu-
lation that purchases annuities. The population that pur-
chases life insurance tends to have shorter life expectancies 
and to be younger than the population that purchases annui-
ties. The correlation between the improvements in mortality 
for these two groups is sufficiently low that the provisions of 
these two products by the same company does not serve as 
a sufficiently effective hedge against life expectancy risk to 
significantly reduce the required reserves.
If regulations do not require full recognition of the mor-
tality risk in determining reserves for longevity insurance 
annuities, the ability of a life insurer to pay for the annui-
ties could be alternatively secured, at least to some extent, 
by cross-subsidization by purchasers of immediate annuities. 
Because longevity insurance annuities are a relatively small 
part of the business of the life insurance companies provid-
ing them, the reserve requirements for them could be mod-
erately less strict than for major lines of business (Griebenow 
and Walker 2012). That approach, however, may be less than 
desirable because purchasers of longevity insurance annui-
ties presumably have higher life expectancy and higher life-
time wealth than purchasers of immediate annuities.
Longevity Risk
Unexpected improvements in life expectancy have a 
greater effect on the reserves required to back longevity in-
surance annuities than on the reserves for immediate annui-
ties because of the substantial length of time before longevity 
insurance annuities begin payments. If longevity improve-
ments depart from expectations in the same direction at all 
future ages, then the impact of these departures compounds 
over time.
Figure 1’s survivor fan chart is useful to an annuity pro-
vider for analyzing the mortality risk it faces. The chart 
shows the likely range of annuitants from a given birth co-
hort surviving to each age. If more survive to each age than 
was expected, the annuity provider has to make higher total 
annuity payments than was anticipated. A previous study 
constructed a fan chart showing the uncertainty surround-
ing projections of the number of survivors to each age from 
the cohort of males from the national population of England 
and Wales who were the age of 65 at the end of 2006 (Blake 
et al. 2008). The chart shows that there is little uncertainty 
out to the age of 75: We can be fairly confident that approxi-
mately 19% will have died by the age of 75. The uncertainty 
retirement security
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peaks at the age of 93; the confidence 
interval band is widest at this age. The 
best estimate is that 36% will survive to 
the age of 90, but it could be anywhere 
between 30% and 41%. This difference 
is a large range.
Longevity Bonds
We now show how a longevity bond 
with the following characteristics can 
help to hedge systematic longevity risk 
and thus facilitate the offering by life 
insurance companies of longevity in-
surance annuities:
•	 The bond pays coupons that de-
cline over time in line with the 
actual mortality experience of a 
cohort of the population, say 
65-year-old males from the na-
tional population. So the cou-
pons payable at the age of 75, for 
example, will depend on the pro-
portion of 65-year-old males 
who survive to the age of 75. 
(See Figure 2.)
•	 Coupon payments are not made 
for ages for which longevity risk 
is low. So, for example, the first 
coupon might not be paid until 
the cohort reaches the age of 75 
(such a bond would be denoted 
as a deferred longevity bond).
•	 The coupon payments continue 
until the maturity date of the 
bond, which might, for example, 
be 40 years after the issue date 
when the cohort of males reaches 
the age of 105.
•	 The final coupon incorporates a 
terminal payment equal to the 
discounted value of the sum of 
the post-105 survivor rates to ac-
count for those who survive be-
yond the age of 105. The termi-
nal payment is calculated on the 
maturity date of the bond and 
will depend on the numbers of 
the cohort still alive at that time 
and projections of their remain-
ing survivorship. It is intended to 
avoid the payment of trivial sums 
at very high ages.
•	 The bond pays coupons only and 
has no principal repayment.
Such a bond would provide a hedge 
for the systematic longevity risk faced 
by annuity providers. If population 
survivorship is higher at each age than 
expected, the bond pays out higher 
coupons. This is what annuity provid-
ers need to help match the higher than 
expected annuity payments they need 
to make in the case of a larger than an-
retirement security
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Survivor Fan Chart—Males Aged 65
Source: Cairns Blake Dowd model.
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ticipated increase in longevity. If, on the other hand, survi-
vorship is lower at each age than was expected, the bond pays 
out lower coupons. But the annuity payments are also likely 
to be lower.
The bond, however, provides a perfect hedge for the sys-
tematic longevity risk faced by annuity providers only if 
the annuitants have exactly the same mortality experience 
over time as the cohort underlying the bond. If the annui-
tants have a mortality experience that differs from that of the 
national population, this introduces basis risk. In practice, 
there always is some basis risk. One reason for this is that 
annuity providers have far fewer members than the national 
population and therefore experience greater random varia-
tion risk than the national population. The greater random 
variation risk is likely to cause the mortality experience of a 
subpopulation to diverge from that of the national popula-
tion over time, even if that subpopulation has the same mor-
tality profile at the outset. Despite the imperfect nature of the 
hedge that longevity bonds would provide, industry insiders 
estimate that their absence raises the price of an annuity by 
3% (Blake et al. 2013, footnote 13). The effect would be larger 
for longevity insurance annuities because of their long defer-
ral. With £12 billion annual sales of annuities in the U.K., this 
implies a cost to every new annual cohort of retirees in the 
U.K. alone of £360 million.
For three reasons, the government should consider shar-
ing longevity risk with the private sector and be the provider 
of these bonds. It:
•	 Has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity 
market
•	 Has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital 
market for longevity risk transfers
•	 Is best placed to engage in intergenerational risk shar-
ing, such as by providing tail risk protection against 
systematic trend risk.
The government has a hedge against its increased cost 
in providing these bonds if longevity increases. That hedge 
occurs when people work longer, and thus pay more taxes, 
retirement security
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Deferred Longevity Bond for Male Aged 65 With Ten-Year Deferment
Longevity bond payable from age 75 with terminal payment at age 105 to cover post-105 longevity risk
Source: Cairns Blake Dowd model.
0
20
40
60
80
100
66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 102 105 108
Terminal 
payment
Payment
Expected value 90% Confidence 
Payment at age of 75 =                                            
100 x proportion of aged 65 
cohort still alive
Age
No 
payments 
in first 
ten years
Price 
discovery 
Tail risk 
protection
benefits quarterly first quarter 201446
as a response to longer life expectancy. Government policy 
can encourage this relationship by increasing the social se-
curity retirement age in line with increases in life expectancy, 
which is being done in the U.K.
As well as the government providing longevity bonds to 
facilitate the private offering of annuities of all types, the gov-
ernment could provide longevity insurance annuities, for ex-
ample, as a benefit receivable at advanced older ages through 
the social security program (Turner 2013). This benefit would 
improve the targeting of social security benefits to older per-
sons and to persons with contemporaneous low incomes.
Conclusions
Recent U.S. Treasury Department proposals have focused 
attention on longevity insurance annuities. These are de-
ferred annuities that began payment at advanced older ages, 
such as at the age of 82. While the U.K. has by far the world’s 
largest annuity market, and some insurance companies used 
to provide longevity insurance annuities, currently no com-
panies provide these annuities. The main reason this change 
has occurred is that proposed EU regulations will require 
insurance companies to increase their reserves for these an-
nuities in recognition that there is no asset available to ef-
fectively hedge the risk of unexpectedly large improvements 
in life expectancy.
While both the U.S. and the EU are moving toward the 
use of more sophisticated risk measures for annuity provid-
ers, they are moving in opposite directions concerning re-
serve requirements for annuities. The proposed EU regulation 
Solvency II suggests that the purchase of longevity insurance 
annuities by pension participants and others may be relatively 
risky in the U.S. since regulations concerning reserve require-
ments are more lenient, which increases the chance that a U.S. 
insurer could become insolvent. U.S. insurers, like U.K. insur-
ers, do not have an asset to hedge against unexpectedly large 
increases in life expectancy. Purchasers of annuities in the 
U.S. are protected against default by state guaranty associa-
tions, but the dollar limit of the coverage varies considerably 
across states and can be as low as $100,000. Purchasers of an-
nuities in the U.K. are protected against default by a national 
program (the Financial Services Compensation Scheme).
The issue of U.S. versus EU regulation raises the question 
of the trade-off between the reduction of risk through the 
provision of adequate reserves versus the increase in cost of 
providing deferred annuities and the loss to retirees of the 
insurance protection this type of annuity provides. In the 
complex area of life insurance reserve requirements, we do 
not address what the appropriate trade-off is, or whether the 
Solvency II requirements in Europe are too stringent or the 
U.S. requirements too lenient.
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The lack of a hedge against longevity risk is one factor 
raising their cost to provide and thus may be part of the ex-
planation of why few people voluntarily purchase annuities. 
This article proposes that the U.S. and U.K. governments, 
and other governments, provide such an asset for hedging 
longevity risk in the form of a longevity bond. Providing 
such a bond would improve the effectiveness of the retire-
ment income system by facilitating the provision of annuities 
at lower cost.   
Endnotes
 1. They do provide deferred annuities as part of derisking programs 
(called buy-ins) for corporate pension plans that began in the U.K. in 2007 
(Blake et al. 2013b), but they do not provide longevity insurance annuities 
for corporate pension plans or individuals.
 2. The maximum dollar amount would be adjusted with respect to 
increases in the consumer price index, in increments of $25,000.
 3. The maximum age can be adjusted by the commissioner of the In-
ternal Revenue Service, for example, through revenue rulings, to take into 
account improvements in life expectancy.
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